Success and failure along the Modder River during the Anglo-Boer War : the influence of terrain by Smit, H. A. P. & Janse van Rensburg, H. S.
117 
 
Scientia Militaria, South African 
Journal of Military Studies, Vol 
42, Nr 2, 2014, pp. 117–142. 
doi : 10.5787/42-2-1096 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE ALONG THE 
MODDER RIVER DURING THE ANGLO-BOER 
WAR: THE INFLUENCE OF TERRAIN 
 
HAP Smit and HS Janse van Rensburg 
Stellenbosch University 
 
Abstract 
The influence of terrain1 on military operations is a well-known and well-
researched topic. In a South African context, the body of literature about this topic 
is, however, not as well developed. This article strives to make a contribution to 
literature about South African battles and the influence of terrain on the outcome of 
such battles. During the Anglo Boer War (1899–1902), two important battles were 
fought along the Modder River. The first of these battles is known as the Battle of 
Modder River or Twee Riviere (Two Rivers, if directly translated from Afrikaans), 
while the other is known as the Battle of Paardeberg.2 These battles were fought in 
close proximity to one another, both in distance and time. The terrain of the 
battlefields played a key role in both engagements. This article suggests that the 
spatial arrangement of the koppies (hills) and the fact that they were much closer to 
the Boer laager at Paardeberg than at the battle of Modder River played a key role in 
Cronje’s surrender to the British. 
Introduction 
The article starts with a brief overview of the literature on terrain and battles, 
and then discusses the opening battles of the Anglo-Boer War, up to the Battle of 
Modder River. Thereafter, the Battle of Modder River will be discussed with 
emphasis on the terrain of the battlefield and its influence on the outcome of the 
battle. The events between the battles at Modder River and Paardeberg will then be 
briefly outlined, after which the Battle of Paardeberg will be discussed, again 
emphasising the influence of the terrain of the 
battlefield. Lastly, a comparison between the 
terrains of the battle sites is made, and the 
effect of the differences in terrain on the 
battles is noted. 
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The influence of terrain on military campaigns 
In the preface to their book, Modern military geography, Galgano and Palka 
state, “factors of geography have had a compelling influence on battles and 
campaigns throughout history”.3 Even a cursory study of the available literature will 
affirm this statement. Since the earliest times, the influence of geography on battles 
has been well known and thoroughly researched, with the result that a large body of 
knowledge exists regarding the influence of geographical factors such as climate, 
weather and terrain on battles. Unfortunately, the mere existence of such a body of 
knowledge does not automatically mean that these factors are always adequately 
taken into consideration during the planning and execution of a battle or campaign. 
Two notable examples of the effects of an inadequate understanding and 
appreciation of the influence of climate and terrain on military operations can be 
found in the Russian campaigns of both Napoleon and Hitler.4 Innumerable other 
examples exist. 
In the literature, the influence of geographical factors on battles has been 
recorded by authors such as – 
 Davies (1946) – who analysed the geographical factors that played a role 
in the invasion and battle of Normandy; 
 Ackermann (1957) – with a PhD thesis in Geography on the influence of 
geography during the Anglo-Boer War;5  
 Puckett (1992) – on the Rapido River crossings during the Second World 
War;6  
 Gray (1999) – on “inescapable geography”;7  
 Palka, Galgano and Corson (2005) – who gave a military geographic 
perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom;8  
 Palka (2005) – on the military geographic challenges during Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan;9  
 Hausler (2006) – who discussed historic maps for terrain evaluation;10  
 Schroeder (2011) – on mountainous terrain and the Prussian invasions of 
Bohemia in 1757 and 1866;11  
 Gnaser (2011 – who wrote on the warfare in mountainous regions in the 
Semmering area in Austria during the last days of the Second World 
War;12 and  
 Galgano (2011) – on streams and the military landscape,13 and the 
geography of amphibious warfare.14  
Add to this the seminal work by Winters, Galloway, Reynolds and Rhyne on 
the influence of weather and terrain in the conduct of war,15 Collins’ Military 
geography for professionals and the public,16 and Galgano and Palka’s 2011 
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Modern military geography,17 and it is abundantly clear that much has been written 
on this aspect of military geoscientific enquiry. 
A recurring theme in the literature on geographical factors in military 
operations is the influence of terrain on the battles discussed. Since the early 1990s, 
authors, such as   
 Metzger (1992) – “Terrain analysis for Desert Storm”;18  
 Doyle and Bennet (1997) – “Military geography: Terrain evaluation and 
the British Western Front 1914–1918”;19  
 Doyle and Bennet (1999) – “Military geography: The influence of terrain 
in the outcome of the Gallipoli Campaign, 1915”;20  
 Tate (2006) – “Terrain analysis for Decision Making”;21  
 Kimble and O’Sullivan (2010) – “Terrain and guerrilla warfare in Navarre, 
1808–1814”;22  
 Ehlen and Abrahart (2010) – Effective use of terrain in the American Civil 
War: The Battle of Fredericksburg, December 1862”;23 and  
 Doyle (2011) – Terrain evaluation of the Hannibalic Alpine Invasion 
Route”24  
all made significant contributions in this regard. However, they represent only a 
small selection of authors who deal with this aspect of geographical battle analysis. 
As indicated above, a large corpus of international literature on the influence 
of terrain on military operations exists. In a South African context, this is not the 
case. Many important battles fought on South African soil have not yet been 
subjected to scrutiny by military geoscientists, and consequently have not been 
specifically evaluated in terms of the influence of terrain on the outcome of those 
battles. Recently, authors such as Smit (2011)25 and Dye (2012)26 have started to add 
to the sparse South African literature on this aspect of South African battles. 
This article is an attempt to develop the literature available on the influence 
of terrain on battles in a South African context further. 
The Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902): The start of hostilities 
On 9 October 1899, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR), with Paul 
Kruger as president, issued Britain with an ultimatum that would eventually lead to 
war.27  
The ultimatum demanded that all British troops be withdrawn from the 
Transvaal’s borders, that all British troops that had arrived since 1 June 1899 be 
withdrawn from Southern Africa, and that British troops on the high seas bound for 
Southern Africa be sent back. Failure to comply with these demands would be 
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considered a declaration of war by the two Boer Republics.28 At five o’clock on the 
afternoon of Wednesday, 11 October 1899, the ultimatum expired without any 
response from Britain. As a result, the two Boer Republics, the ZAR and the Orange 
Free State, bound by a treaty to help each other in the event of war, went on the 
offensive.29. 
 
Figure 1: Anglo-Boer War western front (Map produced by TJ Flügel)  
The first few weeks of the war brought a reality check for the British Army. 
The Boer armies invaded the British colony of Natal and encircled Sir George White 
and 14 500 men in Ladysmith.30 On the western front, the important towns of 
Mafeking and Kimberley were besieged and other, smaller towns attacked and 
taken.31 On 31 October, General Buller arrived in the Cape Colony on board the 
Dunottar Castle. As supreme commander of the British forces in South Africa, he 
had devised a simple strategy. He would transport his 46 000 men, 114 cannons and 
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47 machine guns by rail to the north-eastern Cape front and launch a direct assault 
against the Free State and then against the ZAR. 
The changed military situation forced him to rethink his strategy. Kimberley, 
the second largest city in the Cape Colony, was surrounded by Boer forces, while 
General White and his 14 500 men were trapped in Ladysmith, on the Natal front. 
Buller devised a new strategy. He would send Lieutenant General Paul Sanford 
Methuen, 3rd Baron Methuen, with 15 000 men to relieve Kimberley, while he 
himself would take 21 600 men to rescue General White in Ladysmith.32 Two 
smaller contingents, 4 300 men under Lieutenant General Gatacre, and 5 000 men 
under Major General French, would reinforce British forces in the vicinity of 
Colesberg and Stormberg respectively, to stall the Boer advance on these two 
fronts.33 
The opening battle of Methuen’s campaign occurred at Belmont on 
23 November 1899. General Prinsloo, with approximately 2 000 Boer soldiers under 
his command, took up position in the ridges east of Belmont station (see Figure 1).34 
After a brief but intense battle, the Boers, unaccustomed to artillery bombardment, 
had had enough and they fled from the ridge by 10:00, allowing the British to 
continue their march to Kimberley the next day.35 
Two days later, on 25 November 1899, it was General De la Rey’s turn to 
try and stop the British march to Kimberley. He positioned his 2 000 Boer troops in 
the koppies on both sides of the railway line between the two small railway stations 
of Graspan and Enslin. The attacking British soldiers suffered under the hot African 
sun, but once again Methuen used his overwhelming force to win an easy battle by 
attacking the Boer positions in the koppies and forcing them to retreat.36 During the 
battles of Graspan and Enslin, Methuen used the conventional tactics of the time, a 
heavy artillery bombardment of the enemy position followed by a frontal infantry 
attack to dislodge the enemy from their positions. The Boers also followed 
conventional doctrine: dominate the high ground. After this battle, the Boers realised 
that domination of the high ground was not working in their favour, and they 
decided to engage the British from an entrenched position along the Modder River. 
The importance of this change in tactics was not fully appreciated by Methuen. 
The Battle of Modder River (28 November 1899) 
The next geographic obstacle Methuen had to overcome on his way to 
Kimberley was the Modder River. He had to cross the Modder River just west of its 
confluence with the Riet River because the railroad to Kimberley bridged the river at 
that point. The Boers had destroyed the railway bridge, but Methuen planned to 
rebuild it before continuing to Kimberley. He had to rely on the railroad to provide 
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him with everything from food and ammunition to medical supplies. In a country 
without proper roads to transport a large army, it would have been foolish to leave 
this lifeline, even if only for a short time.37 
The historian LS Amery is of the opinion that General Koos de la Rey made 
the correct military assessment of the two previous Boer defeats. He realised that 
using the steep koppies that the Boers had selected as defensive positions at both 
Belmont and Graspan, was neither a good defensive strategy, nor tactically sound, 
but that it actually invited defeat. In the exceedingly flat terrain of the Northern 
Cape, the isolated koppies stood out prominently and formed an ideal target for 
Methuen’s artillery. Once the British soldiers reached the base of the koppies, they 
were in dead ground and could not be seen from the top of the koppies, making it 
possible for them to regroup under cover before launching an attack against the Boer 
positions on top of the koppies. The effectiveness of the British artillery 
bombardment was also increased by the rocky terrain of the koppies, as shrapnel 
ricocheting off rocks led to more Boer casualties.38 Consequently, the Boers 
abandoned the koppies for positions on the banks of the Riet and Modder Rivers.39 
The high river banks and the soft alluvial soil of the Riet and Modder Rivers 
made this an ideal defensive position. Because they were tied to the railroad, the 
British had to attack over a flat, almost featureless plain which formed an almost 
perfect field of fire. The fact that the people of Kimberley used this area from time 
to time for horseracing testifies to the evenness of the terrain.40 
The Boers entrenched themselves on both sides of the railroad to Kimberley, 
from the small village of Rosmead for about five miles (8,05 kilometres) eastwards. 
Immediately to the east of the railroad, the Modder and Riet Rivers joined and 
continued west as the Riet River. The river beds of the Riet and Modder Rivers 
made for excellent defensive positions (see Figure 2). In the first place, they were so 
deep that from the plain surrounding the river, the trees in the river bed and the river 
itself were invisible to an attacking force. On each side of the river, which flowed 
more or less in the middle of the bed, the terrain sloped gently for between 20 and 
200 paces to a vertical river bank that was 1,5 to 3 metres high and had to be scaled 
to reach the plain, 7 to 9 metres above the water. Behind this natural trench, 
defenders could stand and fire at will at attackers who would not be able to see 
them.41 Under normal conditions, the river was nine to 15 paces wide, but due to 
good summer rains, it had swelled to about 30 paces. The river was deep, with thick 
mud at the bottom, making it almost impossible to cross, except at certain drifts, 
which were well known to the Boers. This already excellent position was further 
strengthened by the Boers digging and concealing trenches on the plain just south of 
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the Modder and Riet Rivers, as well as by removing any bushes that could possibly 
hinder their line of sight or impede their line of fire.42 
As the Boers kept a possible retreat in mind, and because the river could 
only be crossed at the drifts, they deployed some soldiers as well as all their cannons 
on the north banks of the Riet and Modder Rivers, as well as in the area between the 
Riet and Modder Rivers.43 Some snipers climbed trees growing on the north banks 
to get a better view across the river.44 
Figure 2: Battle of Modder River45  
A total of 2 200 Boer soldiers, supported by five or six cannons and four 
pom-poms,46 waited in this position for Methuen’s force which had to launch a 
frontal attack over a flat plain that was almost totally devoid of cover.47 To 
compound the British difficulty, Methuen failed to conduct a good reconnaissance of 
the area south of the Modder River station, as the open terrain made it extremely 
124 
 
difficult to do so. The excellent marksmanship of the Boers and the smokeless 
ammunition they used enabled them to pick off British scouts over long distances 
without giving away their own positions. According to Pakenham, Methuen 
complained about the maps he had available, claiming that they were “of little 
value” and that the information he could obtain was of “even less value, as the open 
country, plus Mauser rifles render reconnaissance all but impossible”.48 Two vitally 
important pieces of geographic information that Methuen therefore missed were that 
the Riet River swung sharply to the south on the extreme eastern limit of the Boer 
positions, and that the Boers also occupied positions along the Riet River. 
Methuen had at his disposal only a sketch map of the Modder River in the 
immediate vicinity of the bridge over the river. This was hopelessly inadequate and 
he did not deem it necessary to do further reconnaissance to explore the exact course 
of the river before ordering his troops into battle shortly after 04:00 on 
28 November. For this oversight he paid a terrible price.49 
Methuen’s original plan was to leave a small force at Klokfontein to guard 
the British supply line along the railway, and to take the rest of his force in the 
direction of Jacobsdal, to the east, and from there to attack the Boer positions at 
Spytfontein (the ridges where his intelligence indicated the Boers would contest his 
advance) from their left flank and roll them up in a westerly direction. Methuen had 
learned from his experiences at Belmont and Graspan that the Boers preferred to 
defend entrenched positions on the koppies and therefore anticipated that the Boers 
would be waiting for him in the koppies and ridges of Spytfontein.50  
On the evening of 27 November, a scouting party met such fierce resistance 
along the river that they reported that a large force of Boers occupied the area 
around the river. Due to the flat terrain, they could only penetrate to about two to 
three miles (about 3,2 to 4,83 kilometres) from the river and could not acquire any 
new information regarding the Boer positions, except to indicate that there was a 
larger Boer force than previously estimated. Methuen did not believe this, but 
reports from scouting parties sent out during the night, as well as those from friendly 
natives and loyalists who stayed in the vicinity of the river, all confirmed that a large 
Boer force occupied the river banks. This forced Methuen to change his plan, and he 
decided to clear the area of Boers first before returning to his original plan. He still 
believed that this was only a Boer outpost and that the main force waited at 
Spytfontein. 
Methuen’s new plan was to attack the Boers in the front and from the flanks. 
The railroad to Kimberley split the battlefield in two in the vicinity of the Modder 
River. To the east of the railroad, the attack initially went as planned. This provided 
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credibility to Methuen’s contention that the Boer positions were only manned by a 
small force, with the main force waiting at Spytfontein.51 The mounted troops rode 
ahead of the main force and were making good progress when they were met by 
fierce resistance at a distance of about 1 500 paces. Major Little reported to Methuen 
that the area near the river was heavily defended by a large Boer force. Methuen 
ignored the report. For almost an hour the infantry marched forward as if on a 
parade ground. 
The British march came to an abrupt halt at 08:00 when they were at 700 to 
1 200 paces from the Boer positions and the Boers opened fire. The Boers had 
orders to wait until the British were only 300 paces away before opening fire. The ill 
discipline of the Boers saved Methuen from total disaster as it averted the 
decimation of his force.52 However, Methuen still lost many soldiers, and his attack 
ground to a halt. The soldiers who tried to manoeuvre around the Boers’ eastern 
flank came upon the steep banks of the swollen Riet River53 and were shot at from 
their right flank. This rendered the largest part of the force unable to counterattack. 
For the trapped British soldiers, a long and terrible ordeal had begun. With 
temperatures of 43 ºC (110 ºF) on the bare soil where the soldiers were exposed and 
trapped54 and up to 35 ºC (90 ºF) in the shade,55 it was the Scottish soldiers who bore 
the brunt of the suffering. The sun blistered their bare legs sticking out under their 
kilts, and this, coupled with the lack of water, forced some soldiers to try and crawl 
back towards the water carts.56 This brought the Boer snipers into play, and the 
Coldstream Guards especially lost many men in this way. This desperate situation 
lasted for more than ten hours.57 During the rest of the battle, the flat terrain on 
which they lay pinned down made any attempt at communication extremely 
difficult, as anyone moving on the battlefield was shot down, even at long 
distances.58 
West of the railway line, the British fared better. After the initial surprise of 
the Boer attack, the British regrouped, and the reserve forces marched west behind a 
low ridge. They managed to progress unnoticed to about 2 000 paces from the 
Modder River on the Boers’ right flank.59 
Opposite the small village of Rosmead, General Pole-Carew and his men 
were met with fierce resistance from Commandant Greyling of the Boer forces, who 
was entrenched behind a low hill and farmhouse, about 300 paces south of the 
Modder River. Pole-Carew realised that these Boers were guarding one of the few 
drifts where it was possible to cross the Modder River and that he had stumbled 
upon a situation that could offer him a foothold on the north bank. The terrain 
provided the key to accomplish this. A ditch ran from his position to the river bed of 
the Modder River – and the Boers had failed to occupy it. He immediately instructed 
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his men to use the cover afforded by the ditch to attack Greyling. When a British 
cannon started to support Pole-Carew, Greyling and his men found themselves under 
attack from two sides, and Greyling ordered his men back over the river. By 13:00, 
Pole-Carew had secured the drift and his men had crossed the river, taken Rosmead, 
and had begun to roll up the Boer western flank. After this initial success, they were 
attacked by General De la Rey and forced back into Rosmead, where Pole-Carew 
and his men spent a restless night, waiting for daybreak.60 
Although the Boers inflicted heavy casualties on the British, they decided to 
give up their position as General Cronje anticipated that the Boer forces would not 
be able to hold on to it the next day.61 Had the Boer forces kept their firing discipline 
and waited until the British troops were only 300 paces from the river, they could 
potentially have massacred the British and would not have had to retreat during that 
evening.  
The terrain of the battlefield played an enormous part in the battle. The flat, 
almost featureless terrain on the eastern side of the railway line favoured the hidden 
Boer defenders in the beds of the Riet and Modder Rivers. The long distances over 
which scouting parties could be seen and engaged by Boer marksman made effective 
reconnaissance virtually impossible.62 This failure to reconnoitre the course of the 
Riet River accurately, together with the lack of adequate maps and the adroit use of 
the terrain by the Boers, led to the stalemate on the western flank.63 
The British were trapped on the open veld under a burning African sun, 
without much cover or shade, shot at by a nearly invisible foe, and unable to 
manoeuvre to the east to attack the Boers’ left flank because of the Riet River and 
their inability to find a fordable drift. 
Ironically, it was also the terrain that saved the day for the British. The Boer 
generals failed to guard the drift on the British left flank adequately, the only place 
where the river could be crossed. It was here, at Rosmead, with the clever use of the 
ridge and donga, that General Pole-Carew foresaw a foothold on the north bank of 
the Modder River and seized the opportunity. The next morning, as the day broke 
over the battlefield, Methuen found the Boer trenches deserted and he could at last 
cross the river that he had reached 24 hours earlier. 
The toll exacted by the clever use of the terrain resulted in the deaths of four 
British officers and 67 men, 19 officers (amongst them Methuen himself) and 370 
men wounded, and 18 men reported missing in action. On the Boer side, estimates 
vary between 30 and 40 dead and wounded. 
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From the Modder River, the Boers fell back to the Magersfontein koppies 
(hills), while Methuen was left to nurture his wounds, replenish his force and ponder 
the next battle on his way to relieve Kimberley.64 
From Modder River to Magersfontein and Paardeberg 
At the insistence of General Koos de la Rey, the Boers decided to take up 
defensive positions at a line of koppies called Magersfontein.65 This placed them 
directly in Methuen’s way, as the latter had to pass directly by Magersfontein via the 
railway line in order to reach Kimberley. The Boers, having learnt from their 
mistakes at Graspan and Enslin, would stay out of the koppies this time around and 
dig their positions in front of the Magersfontein koppies rather than on the hilltops.66 
On 9 and 10 December, the British shelled the Magersfontein koppies with 
their cannons. The effect on the Boers was insignificant67 as they were in concealed 
trenches at the base of the koppies. Only three Boer casualties were reported, none 
of which was fatal.68 After the two-day artillery barrage, the British infantry 
advanced on the Magersfontein koppies during the early morning hours of 11 
December 1899. Shortly before dawn, the Boers started mowing down the tightly-
massed columns of advancing British soldiers before the latter could open up their 
ranks. The Boer trenches were much closer to the British than the latter had 
expected. Consequently, the command to open up ranks into line formation was 
given to the British infantry too late. By the end of the battle, the British had lost 288 
men with another 700 wounded and yet another 100 missing in action. The Boers 
had lost only 71 men, with another 184 wounded. Although Magersfontein was a 
significant tactical defeat for the British, the Boers did not follow up on their 
success. Instead, they expanded their defensive positions, giving the British the 
opportunity to build up a huge force at Modder River.  
After Buller’s defeat at Colenso, the British government decided to replace 
him as supreme commander with General (Lord) Frederick Sleigh Roberts. On 
11 February 1900, Roberts launched his campaign from Modder River against 
Cronje, who was still dug in at Magersfontein.69 
When French broke through the Boer lines and relieved Kimberley on 
15 February,70 Cronje realised that he could be outflanked by Roberts, and he 
decided to retreat in the direction of Bloemfontein.71 Cronje was of the opinion that 
Roberts would move on Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State Boer 
republic, which lay south-east of Magersfontein. He believed that, with the help of 
reinforcements on their way from the Natal front, he could prevent Roberts from 
reaching Bloemfontein. Cronje’s departure from Magersfontein was part of his 
tactics to tire the enemy by continually taking up defensive positions in front of 
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them. From these positions he would attempt to inflict heavy casualties on the 
attacking British force while protecting his own vastly outnumbered Boer force. 
During the evening of 15 February 1900, Cronje, with his force of around 
5 000 men and 400 ox waggons, retreated from Magersfontein. The British 
6th Division slept so well that evening that they did not notice the retreat until early 
on the morning of 16 February. Lord Kitchener, Chief of Staff of Lord Roberts, 
realised that Cronje planned to cross the Modder River to the south-east in order to 
curb the British advance on Bloemfontein. To halt, or at least slow Cronje down, 
Kitchener ordered the 13th Brigade, along with Lieutenant Colonel Hannay’s 
brigade, to immediately set after Cronje and impede his progress by attacking him 
from the rear. Kitchener had hoped to slow Cronje down sufficiently to allow the 
various British divisions that were spread out over a vast distance to amass and catch 
up. The fast-moving cavalry of the two British brigades soon caught up with Cronje 
and engaged his rear guard, which defended the slow-moving retreat defiantly 
throughout the day.72 By early evening of 16 February, Cronje had taken up a good 
defensive position on the northern bank of the Modder River at Klipkraaldrif, and 
nightfall suspended the hostilities. The heavy fighting during the day had severely 
tired both the two British brigades and Cronje’s army.73 
Cronje had to cross the Modder River from the northern bank to the southern 
bank in order to gain a position between Roberts and Bloemfontein. However, 
crossing the swollen Modder River with 400 ox waggons, pulled by very tired oxen, 
was a daunting task. Cronje was searching for a crossing that offered good defensive 
positions on both sides of the river. He believed that Koedoesdrif, approximately 20 
kilometres north-east of his position at Klipkraaldrif, was where they could safely 
cross. He was also of the opinion that the terrain of the area around Koedoesdrif 
would enable his force to use the area as a defensive position that would keep 
Roberts from reaching Bloemfontein. Koedoesdrif is overlooked by a hill on the 
northern bank of the Modder River and a line of koppies, running in a south-south-
westerly direction on the southern bank. Cronje knew that Roberts would have to 
pass Koedoesdrif, because the Modder River was the only source of water large 
enough to sustain his force on its march to Bloemfontein. Cronje therefore planned 
to use Koedoesrand and the koppies to its south as a defensive position. 
Cronje was hoping that the two British brigades would be so tired from the 
day’s fighting that they would not notice his departure for Koedoesdrif during the 
night of 16 February. His plan worked well. His force moved as fast as the oxen 
could pull the waggons and this created some space between him and his pursuers. 
Those oxen that could not keep up were left behind. The small group of women and 
children, around 275, as well as the rest of his marching army were exhausted. For a 
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second night in a row they were not able to sleep, but had to continue the march. In 
addition, there was no time to eat properly as Cronje’s force had been living on 
rusks and water during their retreat. At midnight on 16 February, Cronje ordered his 
force to rest at Paardebergdrif.74 
The Battle of Paardeberg (17–27 February 1900) 
After resting for four hours at Paardebergdrif, the Boers started trekking 
again in the direction of Koedoesdrif. By 08:00 on 17 February, the vanguard of the 
Boer force had reached Wolwekraal, around midway between Paardebergdrif and 
Koedoesdrif (see Figure 3). Cronje, who could now see Koedoesrand, gave the order 
to outspan,75 as he was of the opinion that he had put enough daylight between 
himself and the pursuing British force. He decided that his force should cross the 
Modder River at Vendusiedrif, about two kilometres west of Wolwekraal, and 
continue on the southern bank of the Modder River until they reached Koedoesdrif, 
which was now only eight kilometres to their east. Cronje was mistakenly under the 
impression that the small patrol he had sent to secure Koedoesrand during the 
evening of 16 February had done their duty and that Koedoesrand and Koedoesdrif 
were now under his control. The tired Boers made full use of the opportunity to rest 
by unyoking the oxen, slaughtering and roasting sheep, as well as cooking food. For 
most of the Boers, this was their first hot meal in days. 
Cronje, however, was completely unaware of the movements of Major 
General French. French and his utterly exhausted cavalry division, who had just 
relieved Kimberly, received orders from Roberts at 10:00 on 16 February to start 
pursuing the retreating Cronje,76 who was about 50 kilometres east of Kimberley. 
French gathered his fatigued men and set off after Cronje with 1 200 cavalrymen 
and 356 artillerists. By 10:15 on 17 February, French had reached Kameelfontein, 
about 10 kilometres north of the outspanned Boer force. French climbed a nearby 
hill and was pleased to see Cronje’s force stretched out below him. The koppies at 
Kameelfontein are about 500 feet (approximately 152 meters) above the Modder 
River and provided French with an excellent view of Cronje’s convoy. 
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Cronje was so focused on inspanning that he did not notice French and his 
12 cannon crossing the koppies at Kameelfontein. Unmolested, French brought his 
cannon into range, to the north of Cronje 
Figure 3: Battle of Paardeberg77  
 
At 11:15, just as Cronje’s first waggons were starting to cross the Modder 
river, French’s cannons fired their first salvo on Vendusiedrif. This caused great 
panic in the Boer camp, driving them to run for cover in the river bed, and a large 
number of oxen and horses were killed during the barrage. Those animals that were 
not killed were scattered in all directions as their drivers deserted them in order to 
find cover. The loss of oxen made it nearly impossible for Cronje’s convoy to move 
any further. 
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Only those Boers on the western flank, under General Froneman, and those 
on the eastern flank under Commandant De Beer, did not seek cover in the river bed. 
The Boer artillery battery, under command of Major Albrecht, maintained their 
discipline and immediately answered French’s artillery with four cannon. General 
Froneman, witnessing Major Albrecht’s counterattack, started attacking the British 
western flank with his infantry. In the meantime, De Beer took Koedoesrand without 
any resistance. After seeing Froneman’s attack of the British western flank, De Beer 
attacked the eastern flank and bombarded French’s headquarters with a pom-pom, 
while his men pushed back the British 12th Lancers, who had been sent to capture 
Koedoesrand. General French was in a precarious position. His men and horses were 
exhausted, he was being attacked in his centre by Albrecht’s artillery, on his left by 
De Beer and on his right by Froneman, and was faced by a force nearly three times 
his own in numbers. However, the Boers did not push home for victory.78 
The citizen Boer force was tired, hungry and demoralised and did not have 
the combat discipline of the professional soldiers they were fighting against. Despite 
the successes of Albrecht, Froneman and De Beer, Cronje could not motivate those 
Boers who were hiding in the river bed to reinforce the counteroffensive. The Boer 
force was unaware of the difficult position within which French found himself. If 
they had obeyed Cronje’s commands to reinforce Albrecht, Froneman and De Beer, 
they could have pushed French back, settled in amongst the koppies around 
Koedoesrand and waited for Roberts’ arrival from the west. Instead, without 
reinforcements, De Beer was forced to order his men to retreat to Koedoesrand as 
night fell on 17 February. 
For the first time since his retreat started at Magersfontein, Cronje was in 
serious trouble.79 His convoy had become immobile due to the loss of oxen during 
the fight with French. By daybreak, French would again be able to attack from the 
north as soon as the sun allowed enough visibility. Cronje also knew that the day he 
had spent fighting French would have allowed Roberts to close in on him from the 
west. During the evening of 17 February, some of the officers serving under Cronje 
urged him to move the army to the southern bank of the Modder River.80 This would 
mean leaving behind the immobile laager that consisted of waggons, provisions, 
women and children. The Boer army could then take up defensive positions along 
the koppies to the south and wait for reinforcements from the Natal front. Cronje did 
not even consider their plan. He refused to separate the laager from the army.81 
After a speedy reconnaissance of his position along the Modder River, 
Cronje was of the opinion that the river bed was a very good defensive position. At 
that stage, the bed of the Modder River was 60 metres wide and up to 12 metres 
deep at some points. Cronje felt that the river would provide sufficient cover for his 
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people.82 The broad, sloping banks of the Modder River were covered in bushes and 
trees that provided shelter and concealment. There were many dry gullies that ran 
perpendicular to the river, which provided natural trenches. Breytenbach states, “Dit 
het inderdaad gelyk na net so ’n goeie stelling as wat die Boere by Twee Riviere of 
by Magersfontein gehad het.” (It indeed looked just as good a position as the Boers 
had at Twee Riviere [Battle of Modder River] and at Magersfontein.)83 Cronje 
thought that he could hold out along the banks of the Modder at Vendusiedrif until 
Boer reinforcements arrived. However, unknown to Cronje, his position was in a 
shallow basin about 14 kilometres long and 10 kilometres wide. The koppies that 
surrounded his position would provide excellent artillery positions from where he 
could be attacked. Cronje ignored the terrain around his position to his peril. 
At dawn on 18 February, Cronje, with just over 4 000 men, lay waiting for 
the enemy. During the night, they had made use of the soft sandy soil to make 
dugouts for themselves. The women and children were placed in holes and caves in 
the high river bank. The convoy of waggons was still standing in plain sight of the 
British on the northern plain.84 
Meanwhile, Roberts fell ill and stayed behind at Jacobsdal, some 20 
kilometres south of Paardeberg.85 According to normal military custom, Lieutenant 
General Kelly-Kenny would have taken over command as the most senior of the 
divisional commanders. Roberts, however, effectively placed his chief of staff, 
General Kitchener, in command. He instructed all divisional commanders that he, 
Roberts, would convey his orders through Kitchener. The divisional commanders 
had no choice but to consider all commands from Kitchener as coming from Roberts 
himself. 
Roberts, Kitchener and all the divisional commanders were agreed that they 
had to encircle Cronje to prevent him from escaping. However, they did not 
deliberate on how to approach Cronje after the encirclement, which proved to be a 
costly mistake. By the morning of 18 February, Roberts’ main force, now effectively 
under the command of Kitchener, had caught up with Cronje.86 
General Kelly-Kenny ordered his 6th Division to capture the koppies around 
Cronje’s position. His plan was to make use of artillery fire from the koppies to 
pound Cronje into submission until he surrendered. Kitchener, on the other hand, 
was certain that the Boers would capitulate if their position were to be stormed from 
all sides. He planned a simultaneous assault on Cronje’s western and eastern flanks, 
combined with a frontal assault from the north, backed by artillery fire from the 
south. Kitchener was sure that the Boers would not be able to withstand such a 
massive onslaught.87 
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By 07:15 on 18 February, 38 British cannons, placed on dominating high 
ground both north and south of Cronje, were firing mercilessly at the Boer laager. 
Major Albrecht and his five cannons were no match for the superior firepower of the 
British artillery, and he ordered his cannons back into the river bed. This gave free 
play to the British artillery, which could now fire at will without any Boer pressure. 
The British artillery concentrated their fire on the ring of ox waggons that formed 
the Boer laager on the northern bank of the Modder River. The ox waggons formed 
the only clearly visible target, because all the Boers were concealed in the river bed. 
Kitchener, now aware of the fact that the Boers were positioned in the river bed, 
ordered his cannons to fire into the river bed itself. He was sure that the artillery fire 
had softened the Boers enough to allow for a frontal attack. 
Kitchener ordered the 6th Division to attack Vendusiedrif from the south. 
This meant that the British foot soldiers had to move over flat, open terrain with 
little or no cover, in broad daylight, against the Boer force that lay entrenched in the 
protective banks of the Modder River.88 The effect on the British lines was 
disastrous as the Boers mowed down the advancing troops. This episode typified the 
events that followed throughout the day. Time and again British soldiers were 
ordered to attack the Boer position from various fronts.89 On each occasion they 
were met with great resistance as they attacked a strong defensive position over the 
flat and open terrain directly surrounding the river.90 The British lost more soldiers 
on Sunday 18 February 1900 than on any other day during the war. The total 
casualty count on the British side was 1 270, with 303 men, including 13 officers, 
killed, 906 wounded (including 59 officers) and 61 (2 officers) taken captive. 
Generals Knox and Macdonald were among the wounded and Lieutenant Colonels 
Hannay and Aldworth among the dead. Casualty counts on the Boer side are not 
completely accurate. However, the Boer losses paled in comparison with those of 
the British. The total Boer casualty count was estimated at a mere 70 men.91 
After reports of the massacre of 18 February, Roberts got up from his 
sickbed at Jacobsdal and rode hard for six hours to get to Paardeberg, where he took 
control of the British forces.92 In the meantime, Roberts had ordered all available 
troops to Paardeberg. He demanded Cronje’s unconditional surrender, which the 
latter refused. At around 13:00 Roberts, now with 73 cannons, commenced an 
artillery barrage against Cronje’s position.93 The artillery fire was kept going for the 
rest of the day and during the night of 19 February. Roberts used the cover of 
darkness and the artillery fire to inch his troops closer to the Boer lines. This was the 
general tactic94 he employed from 19 to 27 February. At 06:00 on 27 February 1900, 
Cronje surrendered.95 His force, severely pummelled by eight days of artillery fire 
from the commanding heights around their position, no longer had the will to fight.96 
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Roberts had amassed a force of 40 000 with 100 cannons by the time Cronje 
capitulated. Cronje tried valiantly to hold out against this overwhelming force with 
approximately 4 000 men and five cannons. Roberts’ tactic of using the koppies 
around Cronje’s position for artillery fire had worked. Not only did Cronje 
surrender, but Roberts’ total casualty count for the eight-day period was only 132, 
compared to the 1 270 of 18 February. In total, the British casualty count for the 
Battle of Paardeberg was 1 402. For the same period, the total casualty count on 
Cronje’s side was 414 with an additional 3 919 men who surrendered on 27 
February. 
Comparison of the battle terrains and their tactical utilisation 
The Battles of Modder River and Paardeberg share major characteristics 
regarding the terrain and its use. Let us start by highlighting their similarities. 
Firstly, both the Battles of Modder River and Paardeberg took place along the 
Modder River, some 45 kilometres and 81 days apart. At the first battle, the majority 
of the Boer force was entrenched in the Riet River, which lay just south of the 
Modder River. However, the Riet and Modder Rivers joined at that point, which 
afforded the Boers the opportunity to also entrench themselves along the banks of 
the latter, thereby gaining depth in defence, as their lines of deployment formed a 
wishbone structure. In terms of geologic structure, both battle terrains fall within the 
Palaeozoic Dwyka and Ecca groups, as part of the Karoo Supergroup, interspersed 
with intrusive dolerites that form the koppies.97 The Ecca group is characterised by 
dark shales, some sandstone layers and coal seams while the Dwyka group 
comprises mainly unsorted tillite and minor shale.98 
Secondly, the river ran through a shallow basin with flat, near featureless 
terrain directly surrounding it. At both the Modder River and Paardeberg battle sites, 
the exceptionally flat terrain was an important distinguishing element of the area in 
which these battles were fought. This allowed the Boers, once entrenched in the 
banks of the river, to bring murderous fire onto the British attackers, who had to 
attack over a flat plain almost totally devoid of natural cover. The only natural cover 
at both battles was the scattered anthills that dotted the landscape. At both battles, 
the British learned that this made for an almost impregnable defensive position 
against infantry and cavalry attacks. Without high ground near the defensive 
position, it was even more difficult to engage the defenders of such a position with 
cannons, as it was extremely difficult to see the effect of the bombardment and to 
direct the firing of the cannon. The soft, alluvial soil of the river beds absorbed the 
effect of the British cannons, rendering the artillery fire less effective than when 
directed at an enemy entrenched in the rocky koppies which compounded the 
shrapnel effect. 
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Thirdly, the vegetation on the flat terrain was sparse and consisted mainly of 
short grass and shrubbery that did not provide much cover for advancing forces. In 
the case of the Battle of Modder River, the Boers had enough time to clear the area 
in front of their position of vegetative obstructions. 
Fourthly, the flat terrain surrounding the battlefields was interspersed with 
koppies. However, at Paardeberg the koppies were much closer to the Boer positions 
than at Modder River. Closer inspection of a topographic map of the area suggests 
that the closest koppies south of the Modder River were approximately 16 
kilometres away. This distance was too big to render the high ground useful as an 
observation post for Methuen. At Paardeberg, this was not the case. The British 
forces had a clear view of Cronje’s laager from the surrounding koppies. The 
koppies to the north of Cronje’s position were between 1,5 and 10 kilometres away 
and between 44 and 160 metres higher than the river. The line of koppies to the 
south was between three and eight kilometres away and between 30 and 105 metres 
higher than the Boer position. From these koppies, the British could clearly see the 
course of the Modder River where they knew the Boers were hiding. It was this 
visibility, afforded by the local terrain, that enabled Roberts to keep Cronje pinned 
down in the river bed. In addition to the koppies being close enough to be used as 
observation and firing posts, the spatial arrangement of the koppies meant that 
Cronje could be encircled from the high ground all around his position. He was in 
the centre of a basin. 
The two battles also shared similarities in the use of the terrain. Firstly, at 
both battles, the Boers entrenched themselves in the river bed. The wide bed itself 
provided excellent cover for the Boer army in the form of a natural trench. The soft 
soils of the river banks made it easy for the Boers to dig in and create shelters for 
themselves, while the flat terrain surrounding the river provided excellent advantage 
over advancing soldiers. The big difference between the two battles is the fact that, 
at Modder River, the Boers could withdraw from their entrenched positions at will, 
and slip away when the tide turned against them. This they did, when, under the 
cover of darkness, the Boers slipped away to Magersfontein to prepare for their next 
battle. At Paardeberg, once Cronje was encircled, withdrawal was no longer an 
option. 
Secondly, the British used the flat areas around the river for unsuccessful 
frontal infantry and cavalry attacks during both battles. Methuen lost 478 of his 
force during one day’s battle at Modder River while Kitchener lost 1 270 at 
Paardeberg, also in one day. Both Methuen and Kitchener ignored the effect of the 
terrain in their attacks. Frontal infantry and cavalry attacks over flat plains against an 
enemy concealed in trenches cost the British dearly. The British victory at Modder 
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River was the result of the Boers not taking full advantage of the terrain. They 
neglected to defend the only point, west of the railway line, where the British could 
cross the fast-flowing Modder River properly. Had the Boers defended the shallower 
crossing, Methuen would not have been able to cross the river and pose a significant 
threat to the Boers’ western flank. At Paardeberg, victory for the British came only 
after they had used the tactical advantage afforded to them by the koppies around 
Cronje’s laager. Their change in tactics from frontal infantry and cavalry assault to 
artillery barrage from the surrounding heights, supported by the slow tightening of 
the infantry noose around the Boer positions, resulted in their outright victory at a 
significantly lower cost than during the frontal attacks on 18 February 1900. 
Ironically, at Paardeberg, once Cronje was encircled, the flat terrain he used 
to his advantage on 17 February became a trap. If he now wanted to break out of the 
British circle, he had to attack over the same flat terrain. The fact that most of his 
horses had been killed by the British artillery bombardment made this all the more 
difficult. 
Conclusion 
At Modder River, the Boers, under the command of Cronje, used the terrain 
to their advantage. The deep bed of the Modder River afforded good shelter for Boer 
troops while the exceedingly flat terrain over which the British had to attack formed 
an ideal killing zone for the Boer ambush. The nearest high ground was too far away 
from the Modder and Riet Rivers to aid Methuen in his reconnaissance of the Boer 
positions. The flat plain, almost totally devoid of vegetation, offered little cover to 
the British soldiers. They were fighting a nearly invisible foe from a tactically 
perilous position. Trying to outflank the Boers by moving eastwards, the British 
soldiers were foiled by the swollen Riet River. Geography gave the British the key 
to the battle. The donga and ridge used by General Pole-Carew to get his soldiers to 
the banks of the Modder River and the drift opposite Rosmead, allowed the British 
to establish a foothold on the north bank of the river. Cronje then concluded that the 
Boers would not be able to repel another British attack and he withdrew his troops to 
Magersfontein. 
Cronje was outdone by terrain at Paardeberg. Although he used the terrain of 
the river bed and surrounding plains to his advantage, he ignored the importance of 
the koppies all around him. While the deep bed of the Modder River, the flat terrain, 
the virtual absence of vegetation, and the scant cover on the battlefield of Modder 
River were replicated at Paardeberg, the situation regarding the koppies was 
different. At a distance of 16 kilometres from the Boer positions at the Modder River 
battlefield, the koppies proved worthless for observation, thus Methuen was unaware 
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of the exact Boer positions. Even when he found out that the Boers were holding a 
strong position in the river, he was unable to use the koppies to direct his artillery 
fire. At Paardeberg, General French could easily ascertain the exact position of the 
Boers from one of the nearby koppies. British cannon fire could also be directed 
from these koppies during the attacks on Cronje’s positions. Once encircled by 100 
cannons from the nearby koppies that provided good firing and observation posts, 
Cronje was doomed. 
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